Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2026

Keywords

Attorney General, law society discipline, restrictions on disciplinary jurisdiction, parliamentary privilege, parliamentary sovereignty

Abstract

In this article, I assess whether the law society can, and should, discipline the attorney general for their policy decisions and those of the cabinet. In addition to a parallel to policy immunity in tort law, I also consider other potential restrictions applicable to policy decisions, including the scope of parliamentary privilege—and related concepts—as apparently broadened in more recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada.

This article consists of five parts after this introduction. I begin in Part II by revisiting the statutory jurisdiction of the law society and the impact of the rule of law considerations embodied in Roncarelli v Duplessis. I explain that law society discipline of the attorney general for policy functions may be beyond the statutory powers of the law society and cannot be used arbitrarily or vindictively.

Against this backdrop, I consider the extended scope of parliamentary privilege in Part III and the parallel policy immunity in Part IV. I determine that a reasonable argument can be made that parliamentary privilege and parliamentary sovereignty would preclude discipline for the development of bills and that policy advice and decisions would be protected absent bad faith or irrationality.

I turn from the could question to the shouldquestion in Part V . I recognize that even if the law society does have the legal ability to discipline the attorney general for policy advice or conduct,

such discipline risks damaging public confidence in the law society as an impartial regulator and, in turn, damaging public confidence in the administration of justice itself. Such discipline might also prompt public and political pushback against the law society, which could result in the reduction of its statutory powers or even incursions on self-regulation. I recognize censure, whether by the law society membership or by a lawyer advocacy organization, as a viable alternative to law society discipline in these circumstances. Finally, I provide reflections and conclusions in Part VI. Ultimately, I emphasize that law society discipline of the attorney general for policy matters would not be advisable even if it were legal.

Comments

"Revisiting Law Society Disciplinary Powers Over the Attorney General: Professional Discipline For Policy Decisions?" was first published in volume 59 issue 2 of the UBC Law Review.

Download

Share

COinS