R v Jones
Document Type
Response or Comment
Publication Date
2018
Keywords
Charter, Unreasonable Search and Seizure, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, Unreasonable Search and Seizure
Abstract
R. v. Jones resolves an issue which was left open in R. v. Telus Communications Co., 2013 SCC 16, 100 C.R. (6th) 221 (S.C.C.): what type of authorization is sufficient to obtain copies of text messages which have already been sent. In Telus Communications the police had obtained a production order which was in part like the one in Jones, in that it required Telus to hand over some text messages which had already been sent, but in addition required the production of text messages which had yet to be sent. Telus Communications only dealt with the prospective text messages, and found that a production order was not sufficient. Rather, that case held, the prospective portion of the order amounted to an interception of private communications, and so an authorization under Part VI was required. One cohort of three judges held that the prospective order was literally covered by Part VI (Justice Abella with two other judges concurring with her), while an overlapping cohort of five judges held that it was at least "substantively equivalent" to a Part VI authorization (Justice Moldaver) with one judge concurring directly, and Justice Abella's cohort concurring): in either case, a production order was not sufficient.
Recommended Citation
Stephen Coughlan, "R v Jones", Case Comment, (2018) 42 CR (7th) 74.
